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VANCE, Cyrus
Brown, Harold
CIABOI TURNER, Adm.

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SUBJECT Interview with Cyrus Vance and Harold Brown

BILL MONROE: Our guests today on this one-hour edition of Meet the Press are Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. They announced this past week that the United States has reached agreement with the Soviet Union on a new strategic arms limitation treaty, known as SALT II. For the treaty to take effect, the U.S. Senate must ratify it by a two-thirds vote. Secretary Vance and Secretary Brown will be the two key spokesmen for the treaty in the upcoming debate in the U.S. Senate and around the nation.

Next Sunday at this same time, we will present a special program with opponents of the SALT treaty.

Secretary Vance, just to get a few facts about the treaty on the record here, would you tell us briefly what you consider the two or three key elements in the new treaty?

SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS VANCE: Yes, I'd be very happy to do that.

First, the treaty provides, for the first time, on equal ceilings for strategic weapons on both sides.

Secondly, it provides for the reduction of strategic weapons on the part of both sides to agreed levels.

And thirdly, it, for the first time, puts limits not only on quantities of weapons, but also on the quality of weapons and the qualitative improvement of weapons.

And finally, the SALT treaty makes easier verification of the provisions of the treaty.

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MONROE: Secretary Brown, the Soviets are building up their military forces, we're building up our forces, spending more money on defense. We're worried about getting a new missile because we fear that our present land-based missiles are becoming vulnerable. Doesn't all this mean that, with or without a SALT treaty, we are heading for a less secure world?

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAROLD BROWN: It is necessary, in my judgment, Mr. Monroe, that we respond to past Soviet buildup by improving our strategic forces. The President's budget, now before the Congress, and the five-year defense plan do that. The same thing is true about conventional forces.

There is no doubt in my mind, however, that the world will be safer and our security greater with the SALT II agreement than without it. It provides equity. It helps, although by itself it does not insure, stability. It provides a good base for further negotiations and reductions, which we hope to have. And it makes verification, adequate verification possible.

MONROE: But you're saying the arms race will be accelerating, even under this treaty, though possibly not as fast.

SECRETARY BROWN: It's difficult to make a judgment about how fast an arms competition is going. I believe that with this agreement the arms race will be substantially less vigorous than it would be without. If you compare it with now, you can reach either judgment. The situation actually has been that the Soviet Union has been doing more in strategic arms during the late '60s and '70s than we. We did substantially more than they in the late '50s and early '60s.

MONROE: Secretary Vance?

SECRETARY VANCE: Yes, I'd like to add just one point. I believe that this SALT treaty provides reasonable, practical, and verifiable constraints that did not exist before, and therefore will tend to slow down the arms race.

MONROE: Thank you Secretary Vance and Secretary Brown.

Our reporters on Meet the Press today are Ford Rowan of NBC News; Elizabeth Drew of The New Yorker; George F. Will, syndicated columnist; and Robert Kaiser of The Washington Post.

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MONROE: We'll continue the questions for Secretary of State Vance with Mr. Rowan.

FORD ROWAN: Secretary Vance, a lot of people are worried that the Soviets might cheat. So I'd like to ask you about

previous treaties that the United States has signed with the Soviet Union. In the U.S. view, how many times have the Soviets violated either the letter or the spirit of provisions of earlier treaties, including SALT I? How many times have we brought this up with them, how many complaints have we filed? And how often have they changed their behavior?

SECRETARY VANCE: We have a system for dealing with complaints which either side may make. This has been in effect during the period of the first SALT treaty. The sides, both sides, have raised questions during the period of the first SALT treaty. There is no question that has been raised that has not been satisfactorily resolved or the practice stopped on either side. We issued a report on this recently, and this is the combined judgment of the various departments within the government.

ROWAN: In 1972 one of your predecessors, Secretary Rogers, said that the United States had a number of interpretations of the first SALT treaty, and we would regard any breach of these by the Soviets as a violation of the spirit of the treaty. Former Undersecretary of State Eugene Rostow says that all of these agreements, these interpretations have been violated, and the United States has done nothing about it. Is he accurate?

SECRETARY VANCE: No, he is not.

ELIZABETH DREW: Secretary Brown, in defending this treaty, the Administration claims that it does not stop the United States from developing any weapon system that it otherwise would want to develop, and yet it does put curbs on what the Soviet Union would develop. If that's true, why would the Soviets sign such a treaty?

SECRETARY BROWN: The Soviet Union and the United States have a common interest in reducing the chance of nuclear war and of limiting strategic armaments. As is the case with labor negotiations or business arrangements, and is also true of diplomatic negotiations, it's not necessary that one side has to lose in order for the other side to gain. Both can gain.

I believe that the Soviets are concerned that if the arms competition continues and escalates, that the United States can outpace the Soviet Union. There's no doubt that we have the resources and the technology that would enable us to do it. And I think if it came to that, we would also have the will. One can't be sure in advance, but I think the Soviets have those concerns. They want to cap what we might do in strategic arms. We want to cap what they might do in strategic arms.

There's also a desire, perhaps, to divert resources that might otherwise go into the strategic arms -- into strategic

arms into other areas, perhaps conventional armaments, in the case of the Soviets, or perhaps into the economic improvement which they so sorely need.

MONROE: Mr. Vance, go ahead.

SECRETARY VANCE: The Soviet Union has had severe economic problems. There's no question about that. And therefore, if there were no SALT treaty, it would obviously lead to a skewing of priorities, insofar as they're concerned.

And thirdly, the Soviet leadership has laid its prestige on the line in pushing for this SALT treaty.

I think those are other factors that need to be taken into account.

DREW: Secretary Brown, in addition to allowing each side to build one new missile system, the treaty also allows the Soviet Union to modify existing systems up to -- within a range of five percent. Are our verification capacities really that good that we can tell?

SECRETARY BROWN: We can tell if they are building a new instead of a modified missile system.

DREW: But can we measure five percent?

SECRETARY BROWN: We can measure in that neighborhood for the items that are controlled: throw-weight, dimensions of the missile, and so on.

The main point, Mrs. Drew, is that we are limiting both sides to one new ICBM during this period. And that is another way of setting a qualitative limit on the arms competition.

MONROE: ICBM being?

SECRETARY BROWN: Intercontinental ballistic missile.

MONROE: One new ballistic missile -- one new...

SECRETARY BROWN: Intercontinental...

MONROE: ...intercontinental ballistic missile on each side is permitted under the treaty.

SECRETARY BROWN: On each side. That's right.

GEORGE WILL: Secretary Vance, the Soviet's Backfire bomber has approximately four-fifth the range and payload of our

B-1 bomber that we cancelled, and can fly unrefueled to strike the United States and land in a third country, such as Cuba. It is estimated to increase the Soviet destructive power 30 to 40 percent.

Why did we yield to the Soviet demand that no Backfires be counted against their SALT totals, while agreeing that even our mothballed B-52s and our B-1 prototypes should be counted?

SECRETARY VANCE: Mr. Will, as I believe you know, the test of whether or not a bomber is to be included as a heavy bomber, and thus brought under the treaty, does not depend upon whether or not a bomber could reach the United States. For example, we have some 67 FB-111 bombers which could reach the Soviet Union. In addition, we have over 500 planes based in Europe which can reach the Soviet Union. They're not included. And in the same fashion, the Backfire, which was designed as not an intercontinental system, is treated in the same way that they are.

MONROE: Secretary Brown, do you want to comment?

SECRETARY BROWN: I would add to Secretary Vance's point that central systems, so-called, are covered, and many others are left out of this particular treaty, perhaps to be covered in a further one; that there are limitations placed on Backfire as part of this negotiation, a limitation to be placed on the number produced per year. That, in turn, will discourage the Soviets from using -- from planning to use Backfire in a strategic role. It plays a rather significant role in medium-range capabilities, against Western Europe or China, for example, and in naval aviation.

The limit that is to be placed on production means that if the Soviets are to use it, or plan it for strategic use against the United States, it'll have to be diverted against -- from these other uses. It will add much less to their strategic capability, to do that, than it will subtract from their medium-range and conventional capability.

WILL: Secretary Vance, it's my understanding that we assert the right, under SALT II, to build a comparable plane to the Backfire. Is that correct?

SECRETARY VANCE: We have the right to do so. Yes.

WILL: Does that mean comparable to the Soviets' description of the Backfire's capability or comparable to what we know to be the case? That is, if we build a plane capable of striking the Soviet Union from the continental United States unrefueled and landing in a third country, will we reject any contention, predictably forthcoming, that it is therefore a heavy

bomber?

SECRETARY VANCE: No. It would depend upon the actual configuration of the plane that we thought best met our requirements for that type of a mission, a medium-range mission.

SECRETARY BROWN: Yeah. If we build a medium-range bomber and use it in a medium-range role, plan it for a medium-range role, then it would be under the same kind of restrictions as the Backfire.

ROBERT KAISER: Secretary Brown, why do so many former senior officers of the United States military, former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs and others, think that this is a bad treaty?

SECRETARY BROWN: There's a tendency, Mr. Kaiser, on the part of, particularly of retired people who don't have the current responsibility for U.S. forces, to look at the question of possible limitations that they think are being placed on the U.S. and to ignore the limitations that are being placed on the Soviet Union. They look at the comparative forces, and, because of their military experience, they tend to exaggerate the forces on the other side, underestimate the value of the forces on our side. And they therefore may believe that the solution is to build up our forces enormously.

Well, we do have to build up our forces, continue to build them up, as we've been doing. But if you ask how to reduce the threat to the United States, it's also extremely important to limit the Soviet Union.

Serving officers tend to appreciate that better.

KAISER: Are there reasonable grounds on which honest men can oppose this treaty? And if so, what are they?

SECRETARY BROWN: Yes, there are. You will be hearing them, I'm sure, next week, and some of them will be implicit in the questions today.

I think that the most concern that I've heard from reasonable opponents of the treaty lies with the possibility that a SALT II treaty, ratified, as I hope and expect it will be, will lead to euphoria in this country, which will cause us to assume that we don't have to have a strong defense, that somehow a SALT II agreement or other arms limitation agreements are a substitute for a strong defense.

It's not. I don't think it is. Secretary Vance doesn't think it is. The President doesn't think so. The Administration doesn't think so.

MONROE: Secretary Vance, you want to add something?

SECRETARY VANCE: Yes, I'd like to make a very brief point. I think it's terribly important that we have a full and fair debate on this issue. It's one of the most important issues that'll be coming before the Congress of the United States and the American people in our generation, and it is essential that we have this debate, so people can understand in simple terms what the issues are.

And I believe the issue is a very simple one: Does this treaty enhance our security or does it jeopardize it? I think the answer is very clear. It enhances our security.

DREW: Secretary Vance, on one of the issues that will be coming up in the debate you have said that you did not believe that the United States should link Soviet behavior with its consideration of the SALT treaty.

Are there any limits on what the Soviets might do that would make you think that they ought to be taken into consideration when the Senate is debating this treaty?

SECRETARY VANCE: Mrs. Drew, I really don't want to speculate on what kind of actions might be possible in the future. I think that in terms of the psychological atmosphere in the Congress, that what does and does not happen in the next six months will have a psychological effect, probably, on the thinking of a number of members of the Congress.

DREW: But are there any lines you would draw?

SECRETARY VANCE: I'd prefer not to speculate on it, because I don't believe they're going to happen.

DREW: As you know, various senators are suggesting reservations or amendments to the treaty. And the Administration, of course, is saying that it doesn't want any. But there are also indications the Administration might, in the end, be willing to accept some.

Are you absolutely ruling out accepting any changes in this treaty as you're sending it up?

SECRETARY VANCE: This treaty is a very carefully drafted document, drafted over a period of almost seven years. It is interrelated and intertwined, and various parts of it bear upon other parts. Therefore, to amend any part runs a grave risk of killing the treaty completely. I can think of no real substantive change, in terms of an amendment, that wouldn't jeopardize the existence of the treaty.

ROWAN: Secretary Brown, I'd like to ask you about the question of whether this treaty should be judged in a broader perspective of how the Soviets are handling their diplomatic relations around the world, linking this treaty with other Soviet activities.

When the Soviets were destabilizing international politics in Africa, for example, Administration spokesmen were saying, "We'll judge the treaty on its own merits." Now the Soviets seem to be on somewhat better behavior, and yesterday in a speech you suggested that without SALT our relations with the Soviets would be damaged and it would affect global politics.

In your view, which is the proper way to look at this treaty: on its own merits only, or in terms of the overall relationship?

SECRETARY BROWN: The treaty needs to be judged on its merits and it has to stand on its merits, its effect on U.S. security, which, as Secretary Vance said, will be enhanced by this treaty.

We nevertheless need to consider the overall context of our relations with the Soviet Union. When they behave in a way that we think is not helpful, clearly, it affects senatorial attitudes, it affects public attitudes.

But I think neither they nor we can hold this treaty hostage to other events, because the treaty is in our -- in the interests of both of us.

ROWAN: Well, the reason that I ask this question is that, historically, arms control limitations in the absence of overall political agreements tend to have failed. For example, the agreements on limiting navies prior to World War II failed miserably, and we had World War II. And in this case we've again tried to limit arms without any overall political accommodation, and yet one of the arguments for the arms treaty is that it will bring about a political accommodation.

Perhaps you or the Secretary of State would like to enlighten us as to how, in light of SALT I, where there were further destabilizing acts by the Soviet Union, you expect that SALT II will do a better job.

SECRETARY BROWN: Arms limitations won't assure peace, but sometimes they have stuck -- chemical warfare limitations, for example -- even when peace didn't. The failure of arms limitations does increase tensions and it does increase risks.

MONROE: Mr. Vance?

SECRETARY VANCE: I would point out just one or two things. The ballistic missile treaty has stuck. It has been a very positive influence in stabilizing the danger of war between our two countries. The SALT I agreement has stuck. And, again, I think that has had a positive stabilizing effect.

KAISER: Secretary Vance, some opponents of SALT say that we're making a big mistake when we assume that the Soviets agree with us on a basic matter of strategy, the thought that a country that risks losing a large part of its population and its economic structure in a nuclear exchange will therefore be deterred from getting into a nuclear war. These opponents point to the Soviet military writings and public statements that suggest that the Soviets are actually preparing to fight and to win a nuclear war, and that our assumption that they believe in our sort of deterrence is wrong-headed.

How do you react to that?

SECRETARY VANCE: I'd like to respond very briefly, and then ask Harold to expand on this, because this is an area in which Harold has spent much of his life.

I believe that the theory of deterrence, mutual deterrence is a valid theory, and that that theory will and should be maintained, and that that will act as a brake on either side taking the catastrophic step of launching a nuclear war.

Now, if Harold could expand on that, I'd appreciate it.

SECRETARY BROWN: There is probably a spectrum of views in the Soviet Union, as there is in the United States, on what deters a nuclear war and on whether a nuclear war is winnable. Military people, understandably, do not like to be forced into saying, "I can't defend my country. I can only retaliate for it." It's their job to be able to fight a war. And the difficulties posed to that approach by nuclear weapons, by ballistic missiles, and by the ability of the offense to concentrate and saturate the defense, which has wiped out previous capabilities for defense that people may have thought would exist, I think, has come as a very difficult lesson for professional military people, including students of military matters, to learn.

Nevertheless, the facts exist. Nuclear weapons are inconceivably destructive. And therefore, a nuclear war would almost certainly involve the deaths, both in the U.S. and the Soviet Union, of tens of millions, probably a hundred million people on each side.

When you have, as I have done, stood 200 miles from

a thermonuclear bomb explosion before dawn and been able to read a newspaper by its light for 10 or 15 seconds, you begin to realize how destructive nuclear weapons are and you begin to realize that it will not be possible to tell the difference between winners and losers in a nuclear war.

KAISER: Secretary Vance, what's the danger to the United States, as a diplomatic matter, of completing a treaty at this time with a country whose principal leader appears to be in very frail health and who might not, indeed, be the principal leader by the time the Senate comes to vote on this treaty?

SECRETARY VANCE: We are concluding a treaty with the Soviet Union. It is not a treaty concluded between individuals. This is a treaty which through its long and tortuous development has been before the governments of both countries. Decisions on the strategic matters which are included in the treaty have been taken, in the case of the Soviet Union, by the Politburo as a Politburo, as we have reached our decisions by a full consultation within the whole American government.

WILL: Secretary Brown, the Administration is said to be considering deploying the MX missile in multiple silos, and says this would be permitted by SALT II. But it has been reported that Mr. Warnke asked the Soviets informally if they thought it would be permitted, and they said no, they thought that would be illegal.

Will there be a formal bilateral agreement in the final form of this incorporating the right of the United States to so deploy MX?

SECRETARY BROWN: The treaty allows for the deployment after the expiration of the protocol -- that is, at the end of 1981 -- of mobile systems. A mobile system is one in which the missile and its firing mechanism are moved around from one place to another. And any system that we deploy will meet that criterion.

What's more important is that such a system be verifiable. We don't worry about the verifiability of our systems. We know that we're going to abide by the treaty. But we have to ask ourselves, of any of the various mobile systems we're considering -- and we're considering several -- how would we feel about its verifiability if the Soviets were to deploy it? We're going to judge what we do by that standard. We will abide by that standard of verifiability and we will abide by the treaty.

WILL: Secretary Brown, there was in December a test of an SS-18 that involved -- and pardon me for the language, Mr. Monroe -- encryption of their telemetry, which is to say they were disguising their results from our observations of it. We,

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I'm told, at that point instructed them that we thought that would be illegal under SALT II. They have done it several times since, although we, I gather, have not announced that.

Do you know and, if so, how do you know -- has it been formalized in some way -- that there will be no such encrypted test results under SALT II?

SECRETARY BROWN: Let me talk first generally about verification. Our verification of Soviet capabilities comes from a system of data-gathering that costs us several billion dollars a year. It involves many different kinds of sensors and equipment. It involves overhead photography, satellite photography. It involves getting radio signals from their telemetry, which are the signals that tell the developer how his missile is proceeding. It involves radars that can monitor the flight of reentry vehicles. It involves aircraft and ships that also monitor.

All the numbers that opponents and proponents of the treaty use about what the Soviets have and how many of various missiles and aircraft they have, all of that comes from this collection apparatus.

We will be able to verify the treaty. And we and the Soviets can agree and have agreed that encryption that impedes verification will not be allowed.

MONROE: We will pause here briefly in this special one-hour edition of Meet the Press with Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown.

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MONROE: The new arms limitation treaty, known as SALT II, between the U.S. and the Soviet Union will go into effect if the U.S. Senate approves it by a two-thirds vote. Secretaries Vance and Brown will be leading the Administration's battle to get public opinion and the Senate behind the treaty. Next Sunday, on another special program, we will be talking with opponents of the SALT treaty.

Gentlemen, let me start this second half of the program by asking each of you this: The Administration seems to be putting some emphasis on the negative, the dire things that might happen if SALT is rejected by the Senate. President Carter has talked about giving this nation the image of being a warmongering nation. Some senators resent that and say they have to vote for the public interest, no matter what image that creates abroad.

Secretary Vance, suppose the treaty is rejected. Why could you not go back to the drawing boards, go back to the Soviet

Union and ask them to make some changes?

SECRETARY VANCE: I do not believe that if the treaty fails of ratification that that will be possible. And let me say a word or two about what the consequences of failure to ratify will be.

I think that one of the consequences will be to fuel the nuclear arms race.

Secondly, I fear that it would cause grave concern among our NATO allies, and, indeed, could even cause some unraveling in the NATO alliance.

There is not question but that it would put the severest strains on the U.S.-Soviet relationship, with the consequences that might flow from that.

In addition, one of the big things we've been trying to do is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries who do not have them. If we fail to bring into being this treaty between the two great nuclear powers, I'm afraid it's going to take the brakes off the activities of other countries who have the capability but so far have not gone forward.

MONROE: Secretary Brown, what is the picture militarily if SALT is rejected by the Senate?

SECRETARY BROWN: If SALT is rejected by the Senate, I think all of the consequences that Secretary Vance mentioned, including great difficulties in achieving other arms limitation, nuclear proliferation, which means that other countries who now are restrained will be more likely to go ahead and develop and deploy their own nuclear weapons.

There would, I think, follow, also, an enhanced competition, an accelerated competition in strategic weapons between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. I think we could stay up in such a race, but at the end of it both sides would have much larger arsenals than they will have without it. The Soviets in particular, who have momentum on a number of programs, will build to much higher numbers, to much more than the 2250 launchers, for example, that are allowed under SALT. And in the end, both sides will be less secure and both sides will be in more danger.

MONROE: Thank you, Secretaries Vance and Brown.

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MONROE: We'll continue the questions with Mr. Rowan.

ROWAN: Secretary Vance, I'd like to return to the

question of whether the Soviets can cheat. Stansfield Turner, the Director of the CIA, in a public speech recently, declined to go along with the Administration's line, and he refused to say flatly that SALT could be verified. He said, instead, he'd give you all the information he could, and you, the policymaker, could make your decision.

I'd like to ask you about what kind of decisions you will make. In light of the fact that we've lost our listening posts in Iran, that secrets have been sold to the Russians about three of our satellite systems for photography and measuring telemetry and measuring radio transmissions, what kind of information do you think you can get, and do you think it will be adequate?

SECRETARY VANCE: As Harold Brown indicated earlier, we have immense capability in the field of gathering the necessary information for verification, and it applies to many, many systems which are repetitive or redundant. And therefore, even though we lose a certain capability which picks up a limited amount of information on a particular aspect of testing does not mean that we do not have, because of the redundancies, great capabilities in terms of verification.

In addition, as Harold will explain further, we are working now to put into place additional backup systems to fill the gap which has been created by the loss of the Iranian stations.

ROWAN: Well, Mr. Secretary, those take years -- and I understand the Secretary of Defense wants to answer to this also. To replace those Iranian stations take years. The former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General Graham, and the former Chief of Air Force Intelligence, General Keegan, say that it's erroneous and fraudulent to say that you can replace those facilities within the life of the treaty.

What's your response?

SECRETARY BROWN: Let me start, Mr. Rowan, with a fact that is often overlooked. We need to know what the Soviet capability is with or without a SALT treaty. The SALT treaty improves our chances of being able to verify, because it forbids interference with our detection, our verification means, it forbids acts that would impede verification, and it provides for certain other things -- for example, counting rules, counting certain missiles with launchers the same if they look the same, making observable differences in different kinds of aircraft systems, for example, so you can tell tankers from bombers.

Without SALT, all the things that the opponents of the treaty are worried about -- cheating, concealment -- all that

becomes legitimate, and we would have a very much harder time verifying.

The second point. We don't verify on the basis of one test or one kind of sensor or one kind of observation. We verify on a whole variety of different systems. Losing one for a limited period, replacing it over a longer period does not prevent us from verifying adequately. Just as I can recognize your face even if a square inch of it is somehow blanked out, so we can verify and recognize what the Soviets are doing by putting together all of this information. And that will be true with the loss of our Iranian stations. We will, over a period of time, much of it -- get all of it back. We'll get enough of it back within a year, in my judgment, so that we will be able to monitor individual tests.

And because Soviet new systems -- and that's what the Iranian stations, more than anything else, were monitoring -- take several years to develop, and we don't rely on a single test to tell what they're about, they cannot develop a new system before we can check and verify what it is and that it complies with the treaty.

DREW: One more question on verification, Secretary Brown. There has crept into the Administration's defense the term "adequately verifiable." What are the parts of the agreement where you have the least confidence that we can verify?

SECRETARY BROWN: "Adequately verifiable" is used by me and others because what is important is that the Soviets not be able to develop and deploy systems in violation of the treaty that would change the strategic balance. This is not to say that everything they do will be exactly, precisely monitorable by us. But it will be sufficiently monitorable so that the balance will not change.

We can, for example, count their missiles, their launchers very well. We can tell rather closely what size they are. Those are the important things, to be able to tell their quality, to be able to tell how many warheads they have. That is perhaps as important an achievement of this treaty as any other part of it. By limiting the total number of warheads that can be put on a missile, we limit the threat to our own systems, we improve stability. That is as important to check as anything else in the treaty, and we can check sufficiently so that we will know they can't upset the balance.

MONROE: Mr. Vance?

SECRETARY VANCE: Yes. I want to add one point to what Harold has said on that last issue.

One of the arguments that has been made frequently by the opponents of a SALT treaty is that the Soviet missiles are larger, and therefore they can throw a larger warhead or a larger missile with more warheads on it.

Take their biggest missile. It is conceivable that they could put 20 to 30 warheads on that missile, if it were not constrained. As a result of this treaty, they are limited to 10. That is a major achievement. And the same kind of a limitation applies to their other missiles, the slightly smaller missile and the third smaller than that.

WILL: Secretary Vance, it does seem, however, to be the case that although you emphasized in your opening remarks today that there would be 250 systems, by and large old systems, dismantled, several thousand more warheads will be deployed by the Soviet Union during the life of this agreement; and because of that, Minuteman will be vulnerable, and Secretary Brown has emphasized that new programs need to be undertaken, as I understand it, as a result of, or at least in conjunction with this treaty.

When being confirmed, Mr. Warnke, who negotiated this treaty, said the following: "If the SALT agreements mean that we must now spend more money to build more strategic systems and continue the offensive arms race, then the SALT agreements should not be approved by Congress. Instead, they should be sent back to the drawing board with directions that the job be done again and that it be done better this time."

Mr. Warnke was accepting the possibility of sending things back to drawing boards, and his criterion exactly suits this: that there has been a failure to control arms.

What do you say to that?

SECRETARY VANCE: I have the greatest respect for Paul Warnke. He has rendered magnificent service to our country in the negotiations which he conducted for us as our principal negotiator during a large part of the SALT negotiations.

It is necessary, if we are going to have a strong United States, to have two things: a strong and adequate defense, coupled with arms limitation, arms limitation which is reasonable, practical, and verifiable. I believe that this treaty does that. And the fact that we may have to spend some additional money for modernization is an absolute necessity as part of the overall protection of our national security.

MONROE: Secretary Brown?

SECRETARY BROWN: SALT, the SALT agreement did not

create the Minuteman instability, and it will not -- I'm sorry -- vulnerability, and it will not cure the Minuteman vulnerability. We need to have a different basing system and new systems in order to do that.

We have limited the threat to mobile systems by limiting the number of warheads the Soviets can put on their missiles. We have not eliminated that threat.

I do not believe that because the SALT agreement is not perfect that we should abandon it.

WILL: But many critics of the SALT II agreement believe that had Secretary Vance and the Administration stuck with the March '77 proposal, they would now be supporting it. In the '77 proposal, there were going to be significant reductions of force, down to 150 instead of 308 on their heavy missiles, and there would be no new ICBMs deployed. This permits the deployment of new ICBMs and doesn't have significant reductions.

What do you say to those critics who say, "If you'd stuck with that, you either would have today a better agreement; or, if no agreement at all, we would know that the Soviet Union is not interested in exactly what you say we're going to get next time, which were substantial reductions."

SECRETARY VANCE: When we went to Moscow in March of the first year of our Administration, we put on the table two proposals, the comprehensive proposal, to which you refer, and a more limited proposal, which would build upon the agreements already reached during Mr. Ford's Administration in Vladivostok.

It was very clear in the discussions there and thereafter that there would be no SALT treaty if we pressed at this time for the proposal which we had made, our comprehensive proposal. That remains our objective. That I believe that we can move towards and perhaps achieve in SALT III.

One has to be patient and move step-by-step. One has to be realistic. One has to do what one can to move forward on this long road.

And let me make one final point. The whole strategic arms limitation negotiation process is a continuum, and you move step-by-step. And what is very important is that this agreement, although not perfect, as Harold says, in terms of our ideal objective, is a sound base for the present and for building in the future for negotiations on SALT III.

MONROE: Secretary Brown, could you make it brief?

SECRETARY BROWN: There's no doubt that if we had been

negotiating the treaty with ourselves, Mr. Will, or even with you, that it would have come out more favorable to the United States. But we do what's possible, and we intend to move forward from here.

KAISER: I'd like to pursue this a little farther, Secretary Brown. There are some members of the Senate and other critics from the pro-arms control position who say that this is really a charage, that you're inviting a situation now, with the construction of a new land-based missile in this country and some kind of a deceptive basing system in a trench under roofs or in thousands of holes for a couple hundred missiles, some new gimmick that when, as is probable, the Soviets eventually copy it is going to make the whole strategic relationship so much more complicated and so much more dangerous than it is now, that we're really kidding ourselves that we're making any progress here if we're building in this sort of so-called progress in our own defensive missile systems.

How do you react to that?

SECRETARY BROWN: I am not very comfortable with a vulnerable Minuteman force. That's not to say that that's the same thing as the whole of our deterrent being vulnerable, because we do have submarine-launched ballistic missiles and bombers with cruise missiles that would survive and wread devastating retaliation.

But although, in my judgment, a nuclear war is not winnable, perceptions of relative strength are important. They're important to ourselves and our own people, they're important to our allies and the Third World, and they're very important to the Soviet Union. For that reason, we have to have essential equivalence with the Soviet Union. And a situation in which a very important part of our force is vulnerable and the reverse is not true -- that is, theirs is not vulnerable -- is not a comfortable position to be in.

We therefore need to replace our present system with a less vulnerable one. It must be adequately verifiable, so that if the Soviets deployed it in the same way, we would be confident that they weren't deploying many more than were allowed. And that will, along with military effectiveness and cost and ability to survive an attack, be the criteria on which we judge which system to go ahead with.

KAISER: Another consequence of this agreement appears to be the acceleration of development of a new kind of weapon which we call a cruise missile, an unmanned airplane, sort of drone. We're now talking about developing land-based cruise missiles that could proliferate in Europe like mushrooms in September and add thousands of new nuclear weapons to the Western

alliance arsenal that the Soviets would have to cope with, another potentially tremendously destabilizing factor.

Are we getting into a blind alley on that one, too?

SECRETARY BROWN: I guess I would differ very strongly, Mr. Kaiser, with the view that U.S. threats to the Soviet Union are destabilizing, but Soviet threats to the United States are all right. I think we have to maintain essential equivalence.

I don't think that the cruise missile is a consequence of the SALT agreement. In fact, SALT does allow us to go ahead with our development of land-based and sea-based cruise missiles, and to deploy them after the exploration of the protocol. The Soviets, clearly, would like not to have to worry about cruise missiles. They would like for their defenses to be able to prevent any retaliatory attack on them.

We think that deterrence requires that they recognize that our forces would retaliate with a devastating blow, and we need to go ahead and build forces that can do that. We need to do that whether there's a SALT agreement or not. With a SALT agreement, we can probably get -- we will be able to get by with less, and things will be more stable. But SALT is not a substitute for U.S. military capability.

MONROE: Since time is growing short, I'll ask each of you to confine yourselves to one question on this round.

DREW: Secretary Vance, actually both of you seem to be conceding the critics' point that the Minuteman, our land-based ICBM force, is vulnerable; in other words, that the Soviet Union has the precision and the accuracy to destroy it; that we would -- our President would somehow sit here and not retaliate or not retaliate in a way that would be devastating to the Soviet Union. Therefore, are you conceding that point?

SECRETARY VANCE: I am not at all.

SECRETARY BROWN: Nor am I. I think I pointed out that we have other forces that would retaliate.

DREW: But you do use the word "vulnerable."

SECRETARY VANCE: Let me speak to this, if I may, for a second, please, Harold.

We have said that during the early and mid-'80s, that there will be increasing vulnerability for our land-based missile forces. That means if there were a first strike to which we did not respond when the missiles were coming in, that a large number of our missiles would be taken out. We would still have the other

two elements of our tripod on which our defense is built, the sea-launched and the air-launched.

However, one should not make the assumption that if such attack were coming in, and we could pick that up very clearly, that we would leave the missiles in the hole.

ROWAN: I'd like to follow up on the question of our vulnerability. Some people have compared arms control efforts to squeezing a balloon. When you squeeze it and limit it in one place, it bulges out in another. And it seems that this new mobile missile, the MX, is the place where the money will be spent in the future.

And I'd like to ask you: SALT is an effort to limit, SALT is an effort to not have concealment, but the MX would be the kind of missile which you'd develop more of, it'd be technologically advanced; and the idea of concealment, the old shell-game idea, runs through it.

Secretary Brown, have you come up with a way where you can build an MX that wouldn't violate at least the premise of the SALT agreement?

SECRETARY BROWN: There are varieties of -- there is a variety of ways to base a missile in a mobile way so that it can survive, so that the attacker doesn't know where to aim his warheads. The multiple hole, the so-called shell game is one, where you'd move missiles around between holes, almost all of which would be empty. Another is to put it in an aircraft and put the aircraft up if you lose warning or if you get warning. And there are others, including one where there's an open trench, so that the missiles can be counted, but so that their position is not known, because they move from one place to another.

As we look at these and various other schemes, we will keep verifiability and survivability as key criteria for selection. And I believe that we should be able to come up with -- pick one of these that meets those criteria adequately.

MONROE: We have only about 30 seconds. Do you have a short question, Mr. Kaiser?

KAISER: Mr. Vance, why can't we drop out of the arms race and just buy what we need and forget about the Russians?

SECRETARY VANCE: Because we live in a real world, and we must recognize that there are threats. The most severe and important responsibility of the United States is that we have an adequate defense, and therefore we must build that adequate defense, but couple it with arms control agreements.

MONROE: Thank you, Secretary Vance and Secretary Brown, for being with us today on this special edition of Meet the Press.